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Economic Inequality and Conflicts: An Overview
Pompeo Della Posta*
Abstract
This article reviews the main points of the academic debate relative to the
relationship between economic inequality and conflicts. After clarifying what is
meant with the expression 'economic inequality', I recall how it is measured
and report the basic facts on income and wealth inequality within countries,
across and between countries and at the global level and provide the possible
explanations for them. I then discuss the main question posed by this article,
namely  the  correlation  between  economic  inequality  and  conflicts.  The
possible correlation existing between within countries inequality and internal
conflicts is also examined, together with the role played by social capital, that
can be undermined by economic inequality. Finally, the correlation between
cross-country inequality and external (or international) conflicts is analyzed,
one of the most relevant of which today is represented by migrations.
Introduction
In this article I review the main points of the academic debate relative to the
relationship between economic inequality and conflicts.
Economic inequality may refer  either to  income or to wealth.  Given that  the
stock of wealth inequality would seem to be determined by the flow of income
inequality,  we  might  be  tempted  to  focus  just  on  the  latter.  However,  the
opposite  causal  relationship  might  also  apply:  wealth  inequality  may  induce
income inequality when it becomes a pre-condition for getting the best jobs, for
example because it allows to pass them from one generation to the other or
because it  allows to undertake the investments – especially those in human
capital and in relational networks - that are necessary to obtain well-paid jobs.
This would represent an environment of inter-generational immobility – as the
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paper  by Franzini  and Raitano in  this  Thematic  Issue shows.  Whatever  the
causation order is, this means that it is quite unlikely that the income and wealth
inequality will follow different directions. Moreover, it would be also quite difficult
to disentangle the effect of income inequality and wealth inequality on conflicts. 
Still, I will discuss as much as possible the differences between them, especially
because  economic theory draws opposite conclusions from the presence of one or
the other (but economic policies do not always follow the conclusions of the theory).
A perhaps more significant distinction on which I will draw my attention – in view
of  understanding  the  role  it  plays  on  conflicts  -  is  the  one  between  within
countries inequality and  cross-country inequality, although one might consider
also  weighted  cross-country (or  between-country)  inequality  and  global
inequality.  Within and  cross-country inequality  have  increased over  the past
three-four decades for several reasons that have been discussed both in this
paper and – providing an interesting historical perspective – in the paper of Petit
in this Thematic Issue. 
In order to discuss the relationship between economic inequality and conflicts
we should  also  clarify  what  we mean with  the  latter.  Conflicts  may have  a
different nature. We might refer either to internal conflicts - including lack of
social  cohesion and trust,  conflicts  between different  groups of residents,  or
between residents and migrants, violent crimes, social unrest and civil wars - or
to external conflicts, including international terrorism or wars between countries.
May be not surprisingly, the first category of conflicts appears associated with
within-countries inequality  while  the  latter  with  cross-countries or  between-
countries inequality, an aspect that the literature does not seem to underline. 
In this article I do not address other kinds of inequalities, like existential and
gender inequality, that are also quite relevant and that are considered in the
paper by Khondker contained in this Thematic Issue.
It  should be acknowledged from the very beginning that the literature on the
relationship between economic inequality and conflicts is far from conclusive.
The empirical  evidence does not always confirm the intuitive correlation that
would  seem  to  exist  between  the  former  and  the  latter.  One  possible
explanation  is  provided by  the  observation  that  conflicts  do  not  have  to  be
necessarily  two-sided,  like  civil  wars,  but  may  well  be  one-sided,  when
repression  prevents  their  open  outbreak.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  actual  or
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expected repressive strength of the richest or more powerful groups against the
poorest/less  powerful  ones  may  play  a  significant  role,  so  that  the  cost  of
revolting against the injustice (the "opportunity" of rebellion) may matter more
than the injustice itself. In other words, a cost-benefit analysis is performed and
if the cost of injustice is still lower than that resulting from rebellion, the status
quo prevails.  This  is  also  associated  with  problems of  collective action and
agents' coordination inducing free riding, such that in the end very few citizens
will decide to join in the rebellion and repression will easily prevail.
Economic inequality can be distinguished in horizontal and vertical. Horizontal
inequality refers to different groups and can be based, for example, on political
discrimination – affecting different ethnical or social groups within a society – on
age  cohorts  discrimination  (intergenerational  inequality),  on  regional
discrimination  (territorial  inequality)  or  on  the  discrimination  relative  to  the
different jobs of workers (occupational inequality). Vertical inequality is based
instead on economic discrimination relative to the difference between poor and
rich individuals. 
Such an inequality, however,  may be less relevant than  equity (honor in the
words or Aristotle,  reported by de Soysa and Vadlamannati  in this Thematic
Issue),  which reflects  the  fairness of  the functioning of  the system and that
might  well  explain why economic inequality  does not  necessarily  cause any
grievance  and  rebellion.  On  this  aspect,  the  rich  paper  by  de  Soysa  and
Vadlamannati in this Thematic Issue adds many relevant elements.
The  rest  of  the  article  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  1  focuses  on  the
evidence  on  income and  wealth inequality,  within  countries,  across and
between  countries or at the  global level. In doing that, I clarify what is meant
with the expression 'economic inequality' (Section 1.1.), I recall how economic
inequality is measured (Section 1.2),  I  report  the basic facts on income and
wealth  inequality  at  the  different  levels  (Section  1.3.)  and  provide  some
explanations for them (Section 1.4). In Section 2. I discuss the main question
posed by this article, namely the correlation between economic inequality and
conflicts.  In  Section  2.1.  I  discuss  the  correlation  existing  between  within
countries inequality and  internal conflicts.  Section 2.2.  defines social  capital,
examines its role and explains why it could be affected by economic inequality.
In Section 2.3. the correlation between cross-country inequality and external (or
international) conflicts is addressed. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
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1.  The  data  and  evidence  on  income  and  wealth  inequality:  within
countries, cross-countries, between countries and global inequality
1.1 What do we mean with ‘economic inequality’?
Economic inequality may refer either to  income or to  wealth. Considering the
former, we talk about  cross-country inequality when we compare the average
per capita income of different  countries by treating them as being all-alike, so
that no adjustment is made to account for differences in the size of population,
extension of the territory, or gross domestic product. When considering cross-
country  inequality,  therefore,  we  also  ignore  the  inequality  occurring  within
countries, since we just refer to the average GDP income per head. Weighted
cross-country  inequality (or  between countries  inequality) is calculated instead
by  comparing  the  average  per  capita  income  of  different  countries  after
weighting it by the relative size of the respective population. This is an important
correction because it allows taking into account the fact that countries may be
very different in terms of population (let us think about countries like China and
India,  whose  population  is  respectively  about  1.410 billion  and  1.350 billion
people  -  but  with  India  growing  much  faster  than  China  –  compared,  for
example, to some less populated countries like Africa – at least for the time
being. Both cross-country and weighted cross-country inequality can refer to a
comparison between single countries or different groups of countries like the
group of least developed, developing or developed ones. 
Within country inequality refers instead to the degree of inequality within each
country. 
Finally,  we can refer to  global  (headcount)  inequality,  which is calculated by
considering the world population as belonging to a single nation, as earth planet
should  be  thought  of,  and  therefore  referring  to  the  inequality  of  income
between persons, rather than between countries (Loungani, 2003, p. 22). 
The difference between weighted cross-country inequality and global inequality
deserves some comments, since the two concepts might appear, at least at first
sight,  rather  close to  each other,  if  not  even overlapping (when the  correct
weight  is  assigned  to  each  country,  the  resulting  income  distribution  would
seem to coincide with the world income distribution across individuals).  The
difference between the two concepts, however, is due to the fact that while the
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former considers the average income of each single country, the latter uses the
actual income distribution within each country, so that the latter is a certainly
more  accurate  measure  of  world  inequality  (Targetti  and  Fracasso,  2008,
footnote  3,  p.  503).  Needless  to  say,  the  same distinction  can be made by
considering wealth, rather than income.
Attention, however, has been devoted more to income inequality than to wealth
inequality.  As a matter  of  fact,  according to orthodox economic thinking, the
former is supposed to provide the ‘right’ incentives to people – what Bowles
dubbed egalitarian pessimism. It should be observed, though, that economists
and policy makers quite often ignore wealth inequality in spite of the fact that it
could be argued that it would produce the 'wrong' economic incentives. As a
matter of fact, inequality is not poverty and the eradication of the latter might
well coexist with an unequal society. An unequal society should not prevent "the
tide to lift all boats" nor for growth to "trickle down" to take the poorest sections
of  society  out  of  poverty.  This  is  why,  after  all,  in  spite  of  the  recent  great
attention that has been devoted to inequality, it was almost ignored until recently
(for  example,  the  UNs  Millennium  Development  Goals  included  poverty
reduction, but they did not even mention inequality!).
A rather simple observation, however, leads to cast some doubts on neglecting
income inequality: if it  increases efficiency by providing the right incentives to
economic  agents,  then  why  have  we  experienced  lower  GDP growth  rates
during the recent decades in which the degree of inequality has increased?
1.2. How can economic inequality be measured and represented?
Inequality can be measured in different ways. The simplest one is just to draw
the income (or  wealth)  distribution  of  a  given (country  or  world)  population,
reporting in a graph the percentage of people (on the vertical  axis) which is
earning  different  income  intervals  (on  the  horizontal  axis).  The  cumulative
distribution  also  provides  a  first  intuition  of  the  degree  of  inequality  within
countries,  across  countries  or  globally:  it  shows  what  is  the  percentage  of
people earning an income below a given level.
The Lorenz curve represents inequality in a very intuitive way by representing
on the vertical  axis the cumulative percentage of overall  income and on the
horizontal axis the cumulative percentage of the overall population. A situation
of  perfect  equality  is  obtained  when  each  cumulative  percentage  of  people
11
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obtains the same cumulative percentage of income (for example, 30 percent of
the population receives 30 percent of income). The highest possible inequality
is instead when all income is perceived by just one person (Brandolini, 2001).
The degree of inequality can be represented also by a synthetic descriptive
index that can be constructed, for example, starting from the Lorenz curve. One
of the most popular indexes is the Gini coefficient, which is the ratio between
the area of inequality (given by the difference between the area included below
the 45°  line  representing the absence of  inequality  and the area below the
Lorenz curve) and the area of equality represented by the area below the 45°
line. The value of the Gini coefficient is, therefore, included between 0 and 1.
Needless to say, when the area of inequality is close to zero, the index takes a
value that is also close to zero, whereas the higher the area of inequality, the
closer the coefficient gets to 11.
Another significant - ethical rather than descriptive - synthetic index, is the one
devised by Atkinson (as  described by  Brandolini,  2001).  This  index aims at
evaluating the loss of welfare caused by an unequal income distribution, so as
to measure what would be the difference between the average income and the
one that would produce the same welfare if distributed equally: the higher the
difference, the higher the ethical index of inequality.
Other methods can be used to provide useful indications as to the degree of
inequality.  One  of  them  implies  the  comparison  between  the  share  of  the
income going to different groups of the population (for example, the share of the
total income received by the richest -  or poorest - 1 percent or 10 percent of the
population, or the ratio between the income perceived by the 1 percent or 10
percent richest people compared to the income perceived by the 1 percent or
10 percent poorest people).
Data  used  in  the  construction  of  indexes  are  also  quite  critical,  since  it  is
possible to use both data deriving from national accounts and sample data (that
may refer either to individuals or to household surveys). Needless to say, the
many different ways to use data or construct indexes implies that results may
often diverge from each other, with researchers often focusing on those that
they deem more satisfactory from their point of view2.
1 Another synthetic descriptive index which is often utilized is the Theil’s index.
2 Loungani (2003) refers to this point as the title of his work " Inequality: Now you see it, now
you don’t " already suggests.
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1.3. Facts and data on economic inequality
1.3.1. Between countries inequality 
Many  critics  of  globalization  underline  the  fact  that  the  difference  between
developed countries on one side and least developed and developing countries
on the other side has been increasing over time3. As a matter of fact, the ratio
between the GDP per head (headcount income) of developed countries and
that of least developed and developing countries was 11 in 1870 and became
52 in  1985  (Bonaglia  and Goldstein,  2008)4.  Shaikh  (2007)  also  reports,  by
referring to the work of other authors, that in 1980 the richest countries had
median incomes 77 times greater than the poorest ones, while by 1999 the
same value was 122! In line with these results, Das (2004) reports the findings
of the World Bank (2002), according to which income inequality has increased
between the more globalized and the least globalized developing economies
during the years 1980-2000.
This might lead to conclude that globalization has been operating in a manner
that differs from what is predicted by neoclassical models, more precisely the
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson  model,  according  to  which  commercial  opening
should lead to the convergence of wages and per capita income. 
Other data show, however, that during the second phase of globalization (the
one that started after World War II) the income share of the 10 percent richest
countries had at least stabilized, while it increased again during the third phase,
initiated  after  the  1970s  of  last  century  and  characterizing  the  neoliberal
3 See Della Posta (2018) for a detailed account of the process of globalization.
4 According to de la Dehesa (2006, p. 29), reporting also the position of other authors, the high
degree of inequality between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ of the world finds its true roots in the
industrial revolution. It is difficult, however, to distinguish the role played by colonialism from
that played by industrial  revolution and to ascertain that  international  power  and military
hegemony have been irrelevant in  determining the economic success of  Britain and the
destruction of the Indian manufacturing industry – the world leader of textiles production and
exports before the English take off. As a matter of fact, other analysts argue that it is not by
chance but because of well-defined economic and military policies that while in 1750 the
Third World accounted for 73 percent of world manufacturing production, in 1830 and 1913
this share went down to 50 percent and 7.5 percent respectively (Bairoch, 1982, reported by
De la Dehesa, 2006, p. 30).
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revolution represented by the advent to political power of Margaret Thatcher
and Ronald Reagan. Table 1 also shows that the divergent trend stops from the
1950s  onwards.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  over  the  period  1970-1992,  the  ratio
between the income of the 10 percent richest countries and the income of the 20
percent poorest ones increased only slightly and got stabilized around 23 percent.
1820 1950 1970 1992
Income  share  of  the  10%
richest countries 42,8 51,3 50,8 53,4
Income  share  of  the  20%
poorest countries 4,7 2,4 2,2 2,2
Ratio between the income of
the 10% richest countries and
the 20% poorest countries
9,1 21,2 23,4 23,8
Table 1. Income share of the richest and the poorest countries
Source: Bourguignon, F. et al. (2002)
The relative stabilization of the degree of income inequality between rich countries
and least developed and developing ones is the result of two different tendencies5. 
The first one relates to the fact that the difference between the richest and the
poorest  countries  has  been  increasing  over  time,  as  the  evidence  reported
above shows clearly. The second element, pointing to the opposite direction and
compensating  this  diverging  tendency,  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  by
considering globalizing countries (including China, Indonesia and, to a lesser
extent,  India),  rather  than  the  least  globalized  ones,  since  the  late  1960s
inequality  vis-à-vis developed  countries  has  been  decreasing  thanks  to  the
higher rates of growth experienced by the former compared to the latter6. 
Such differences are also reflected in the different outcomes obtained when
5 As reported by Das (2004, p. 93) who refers to Clark  et al. (2001), inequality between the
industrial countries has been decreasing over time, being in 1995 half of what it was in 1980
and in 1980 half of what it was in 1960.
6 During this period the countries that are now defined as ‘globalizing’ (and that can be defined
as ‘developing’)  have started to industrialize at the expenses of the developed ones, who
began to dematerialize their productive processes and to develop their (tertiary) sector of
services: industrial employment in Europe corresponded to 41 percent of the total in 1950,
28 percent in 1998 and less than 24 percent in 2006  while, over the same period, in the so
called NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries) it went from 14 percent to 27 percent and in
India and China it went from 10 percent to 20 percent (De la Dehesa, 2006, p. 31).
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considering  weighted  and  unweighted  cross-country  inequality.  When
considering countries as if they were all alike, it turns out that inequality has
been increasing over time (UNDP finds that while in 1960 the per capita income
of developed countries was 30 times higher than that of the poorest ones, in
1997 it was 74 times higher). When assigning the appropriate weights to them,
instead, in particular by considering the role played by big countries like China,
India and Indonesia, de la Dehesa (2006, p. 32) finds that those results become
much less dramatic, while Loungani (2003, p. 22) even concludes that between
countries inequality has been decreasing over time.
1.3.2. Within countries inequality
Inequality within countries has been increasing over time worldwide. In many
developing countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, China, India and Mexico
the  wage  differential  between  skilled  and  unskilled  labor  has  increased.
Moreover,  both China and India have experienced an unequal distribution of
development, with costal and urban areas developing much more than internal
and rural ones, which contributes to explain the surge of inequality within those
countries. One of the few exceptions is represented by a country like Korea,
characterized by a Gini coefficient of about 0.3 (indicating a rather low level of
inequality) that has not been growing in spite of the economic growth of that country.
Das (2004) and Targetti  and Fracasso (2008) observe that income inequality
within  industrialized  countries  has  also  increased.  This  is  true  also  if  we
consider the degree of inequality within developed countries as a whole, rather
than within each of them. By concentrating on the income distribution between
the US and Europe, for example, it turns out that over the last decades the US
income has been increasing at a rate which is much higher than the European one. 
If  we  consider,  however,  inequality  within  different  developed  countries  or
regions, we find, as reported by Loungani (2003) that the Gini coefficient in the
United States has increased over time so as to reach approximately the value of
0.4,  while  in  other  developed  countries  (Japan,  Canada,  many  European
countries)  it  has remained rather stable over  the last  decades,  a result  that
certainly  reflects  at  least  partly  the  redistributive  policies  adopted  in  those
countries, characterized much more than the US by the adoption of social programs.
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1.3.3. Global income inequality
By considering the world as if it was made by one single country, that is by
referring to the concept of global income inequality, Sala i Martin (2002a, 2002b,
quoted by De la Dehesa, 2006, p. 32) finds instead that world personal income
distribution  had  improved  slightly  since  the  1980s.  Similar  conclusion  was
reached by Melchior  et al. (2000) cited in Das (2004, p. 95), who found that
global income inequality decreased by 10 percent between 1965 and 1997. The
explanation for this result is rather easy, if we consider the contribution given by
large  countries  like  China  and  India,  where  poverty  has  been  reduced
dramatically and income per capita has increased.
1.3.4. A synthesis
It is possible to synthesize the results described above with the help of Table 2.
below (whose frame and structure is borrowed from Loungani (2003, p. 23)),
which reports the different concepts of inequality and the different conclusions
relative to developed, developing and less developed countries.
Different concept
of income inequality What it measures What the evidence shows
Cross-country inequality
Inequality  of  average incomes
across  countries  unweighted
by the size of the population
Divergence between developed
and least developed countries
Convergence between developed
and developing countries
Divergence  when  considering
all countries in the world
Weighted  cross-country
inequality
Inequality  of  average incomes
across  countries  weighted  by
the size of the population
Convergence
Global inequality
Inequality  between  rich  and
poor people as if the world was
made up of  just one country
Convergence
Within-country inequality
Inequality  between  rich  and
poor people within each single
country or group of countries
Stable in some developed countries
(Japan, Europe, Canada).
Divergence in the United States
and  in  most  developing  and
least developed countries.
 
Table 2. Different measures of inequality 
(frame borrowed from Loungani, 2003).
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These  results  may  also  be  summarized  showing  how  global inequality  (as
measured by the Gini  coefficient)  has been decreasing  over  time,  while  the
overall within country inequality has been increasing over time.
One of the possible explanations for such a diverging tendency has to do also
with the consideration of the different timing of their economic development: the
fact  that  African  countries  have  not  started  their  take  off  yet,  while  other
countries  have  been  doing  so  over  time,  may  explain  the  larger  difference
between the latter and the former (De Grauwe, 2009). 
Figure 1 shows the rather generalized rising (with the only exception of the
Eurozone) of within countries income inequality.
Figure 1. Rising within countries inequality: Gini coefficients
(Source: OECD, Standardised World Income Inequality Database)
The same applies to China, as clearly shown in the Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Increasing income inequality between urban and rural China
(Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)
A similar  conclusion  is  drawn  by  considering  the  evolution  of  the  share  of
income earned by the top 1%, as shown in Figure 3 in several countries.
Figure 3. Share of Income earned by the Top 1 percent, 1975-2015
(Source: World Wealth and Income Database)
18
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The dynamics of income inequality is even clearer when looking at the comparison
between the evolution of different income groups in the USA as Figure 4 does.
Figure 4: Income gains of the top 1% compared
to low and middle-income households (Source here)
Nothing changes considering wealth, with a rise in inequality in the United States,
only temporarily interrupted by the global financial crisis from which only the richest
10% of families has recovered fully and has kept increasing (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Holdings of U.S. family wealth (trillions US$)
19
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The effects of the different phases of globalization7 on inequality in the United
States appears clearly also from Figure 6.
Figure 6. Wealth shares in the USA, 1913-2012
(Source: here).
An additional, rather striking finding is that in 2007 the richest 10 percent of the
US population controlled 2/3 of American wealth.
As we have already discussed,  if  we look at  global inequality,  the  fact  that
countries like China and India have been growing over the last 20-30 years has
implied its reduction, as shown by Figure 7.
Figure 7. Global inequality, Gini coefficient
(Sources:  The World  Top Incomes Database;  World Bank:  Inequality  among World
7 See Della Posta (2018) for a discussion of the different phases of globalization.
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Citizens, 1820-1992", by Bourgouignon and Morisson, 1992, The American Economic
Review,  2002;  "A short  history  of  global  inequality:  the  past  two  centuries",  by  B.
Milanovic, Explorations in Economic History, May 2011).
1.4. Explanations of different economic inequalities
What  explains  the  surge  of  economic  inequality  (income  or  wealth)  within
countries and the relatively better result of both between countries and
global inequality over the past decades?
The surge in both income and wealth inequality that has been characterizing the
past decades is due to several factors.
A leading role is played by technological developments, increasing returns to
scale,  imperfect  competition  and  the  resulting  growing  monopolies  (it  is
sufficient  to  think  about  Microsoft,  Amazon,  Apple,  Facebook  or  Alphabet,
parent company of Google).
A second reason is to be found in the economic globalization and the different
labor division at a world level, also dramatically affected by the technological
developments mentioned above.
A third explanation, but certainly not in order of importance, lies in the reduction
of distributive policies that have been characterizing the neoliberal revolution
(for example the dramatic reduction of the marginal tax rate in the US, UK and
the  rest  of  the  world  starting  from  the  1980s  both  on  individuals  and  on
companies,  and the reduction or even removal  of  taxation on inheritance in
many countries) (See Figures 8 and 9). 
Moreover, in developed countries, over the same period, protection has kept
being granted to many liberal professions, for example regulating strictly the
access to those professions or allowing them to fix the price to be paid for their
services, rather than allowing it to be determined by market forces. It should be
noticed that the protection assigned to those sectors was in stark contrast with
the competition at the world level that unskilled workers have been exposed to,
in spite of the fact that professionals are usually already protected because the
services they supply are in most cases non-tradable, therefore not subject to
international competition.
21
Economic Inequality and Conflicts: An Overview
What all this means is that inequalities have not emerged because of individual
efforts, merits and hard work, in an environment in which the state guarantees
the conditions for a fair competition between individuals. On the contrary, such
inequalities are the result of precise policies aimed at protecting some groups at
the  expenses  of  others.  Belonging  to  a  given  social  class  determines  the
destiny of a person (this was definitely true in the past but the evidence seems
to suggest that it keeps being true today, in spite of the rhetoric according to
which in most Western countries each person has full chances to be successful,
if she deserves it. This may be true in some domains, in which the creativity or
the physical ability is relevant – like music, shows, sports - but it is much less so in
other domains in which connections and social networks still play a dominant role).
It  has not  been irrelevant,  from this point  of  view, also the declining rate of
union's  membership  exhibiting  a  strong  negative  correlation  with  income
inequality (Piketty and Saez, 2013).
A similar  observation  can  be  made  when  considering  the  growing  disparity
characterizing  most  least  developed countries  vis-à-vis  the  developed ones:
Stiglitz (2002), for example, argues that the WTO agreements signed with the
conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  in  1994  are  responsible  for  the  losses
resented by many least developed countries, thereby explaining the divergent
degree of inequality between countries.
Figure 9. Effective tax rate per head of household earning equivalent 
of $1 million of non-investment income in 2010 dollars
(Source: The Tax Foundation, available here)
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Figure 10. Share of federal tax revenue
(Source: Senate Joint Committee on Taxation, available here)
As strongly argued by Piketty (2014) a further reason for the growing inequality
(both at the income and at the wealth level), has to do with the fact that capital
has  been rewarded at  a  rate  (r)  which  exceeded the  rate  of  growth  of  the
economy (g), namely: r > g.
This  has  become  relevant  with  the  liberalization  of  capital  movements
reintroduced starting in the 1970s-1980s8.
2. The effects of economic inequality on conflicts
2.1 Does economic inequality within countries determine conflicts?
Already  Plato  identified  the  very  intuitive  association  between  economic
inequality and conflicts:  “We maintain that  if  a state is to avoid the greatest
plague of all — I mean civil war, though civil disintegration would be a better
term — extreme poverty and wealth must not be allowed to arise in any section
of the citizen-body, because both lead to both these disasters” (Plato, cited in
Cowell 1985:21 and reported by Cramer, 2005)9.
Aristotle also dealt with the same theme as reported in the article of De Soysa
and Vadlamannati  in this Thematic Issue. His focus, however, seemed to be
more  on  poverty  than  on  inequality,  as  he  explicitly  acknowledged  by
8 We should not forget that under Keynesian policies international finance was believed to be
a critical component of the economy that needed to be constrained.
9 Cramer (2005) provides and exhaustive literature review, referring, among others, to Collier
and Hoeffler (1998), Midlarsky (1988), Mitchell  (1968), Muller and Seligson (1987), Nagel
(1974). Parvin (1973), Russett (1964).
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suggesting that a reduction of wealth inequality would not necessarily produce
large gains in the reduction of conflicts. 
In the French revolution the word "egalité" gained prominence together with,
"liberté" and "fraternité". This would suggest that one of the motivations of the
French upheaval was precisely the presence of inequality (although the term
might also refer to political, and not only social and economic aspects, Alacevich
and Socci, p. 37). Zamagni (2009) also argues that global inequality  may cause
serious conflicts and may increase the risk of upheavals and civil wars.
Fajnzylber et al. (1998), Hsieh and Pugh (1983) and Kennedy et al. (1998) all find in
cross-sectional studies that increasing income inequality raises violent crime rates. 
Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) show that inequality is highly correlated, among
many other social indicators, with crimes, homicide rate and imprisonment rate.
When inequality increases, the social distance between groups increases too
(consumption,  housing,  health,  living  standards),  thereby  increasing  social
stratification and creating the ideal conditions for conflicts.
Alesina and Perotti  (1996) (cited by Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002) in their cross-
section study of 71 developing countries for the period 1960-1985, find that income
inequality  was  associated  with  social  discontent  and  sociopolitical  instability
(measured, for example, by the incidence of political assassinations), which in turn
induce lower investment and lower growth. The recent Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt,
and Libya seems to provide an additional instance in which income inequality is
accompanied by conflicts and instability. This would suggest that once a given critical
threshold is overtaken, then conflicts are inevitable. 
Some studies also argue that within country inequality implies inefficiency, since
it determines higher  unproductive expenses on guards and security: given the
relatively less safe environment, people would tend to live protected by fences
and walls since security would not be guaranteed otherwise. This also suggests
then,  that  inequality  produces  a  more  conflictual  environment  in  which  the
security of people is at risk (Jayadev and Bowles, 2006). 
However, in spite of large inequalities, people who are starving do not always
"take the rich by the throat or set fire to their houses" (Montaigne 1981:119 as
reported by Cramer, 2003). This must mean that inequality – at least up to a
24
Scienza e Pace, VIII, 2 (2017)
given threshold - may well be accepted as a natural fact or that the power and
repressive  strength  accompanying  it  are  such  that  the  situation  cannot  be
overturned, or still that for some reasons collective action may not take place. 
As a matter of fact, empirical evidence does not always confirm the intuitively
plausible correlation between inequality and violent  conflicts  (Cramer,  2003).
Lichbach (1989) observes that no theoretical progress is made on this issue
and still Cramer (2003) argues that the limited theoretical connection between
inequality  and  conflicts  has  to  do  with  the  limited  interest  that  the  former
receives in neoclassical economics: "greed" prevails over "grievance". 
Hirschman (1981) explains the rather common lack of violence and conflicts in
presence of inequality with a “tolerance" for it,  induced by the hope that the
observed higher incomes enjoyed by a part of the population provided evidence
of social mobility, so that the same possibility would be given to the remaining
part. This is in line with the idea that conflicts originate from a lack of  equity,
rather than a lack of  equality. When inequality is perceived as resulting from
"fair" premises would be easily accepted. What might not be accepted, instead,
is the lack of equity, namely the lack of an equality of opportunities.
It is also possible that economic inequality followed an inverted U curve shape:
it would cause an initial increase of social conflicts, but once a given level is
reached without solving the problem, the lack of coordination among opponents,
or the expectation that the repression operated by the leading group cannot be
overturned may prevail, thereby reducing the degree of social conflicts for even
higher levels of economic inequality.
According to Collier (2000) inequality is simply not a significant causal variable
in the origin of conflicts: “Inequality does not seem to affect the risk of conflict.
Rebellion does not seem to be the rage of the poor. … Conflict is not caused by
divisions, rather it actively needs to create them” (pp. 10–11).
Weede (1987), among others, also gives evidence of the argument according to
which there is no meaningful relationship between political conflict and inequality. 
A final point here is to note that, historically, inequality varies very little and very
slowly, and yet violent conflicts and political violence appear to fluctuate more
widely. Hence, at the very least, inequality must be insufficient to explain conflict
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and it is not even clear whether it should be a necessary condition. 
Such an array of hypotheses and claims might appear as frustrating, although it is
rather common in many discipline to have opposite views on the same subject.
According to Lichbach (1989) the authors of different studies on the relationship
between  economic  inequality  and  conflicts  do  not  read  one  another  and
monologues, rather than a dialogue, prevail. As an evidence of this he argues that
“for example, students of black protest in the United States and of conflict cross-
nationally have both been concerned with the EIPC (Economic Inequality – Political
Conflict) nexus, yet both have neglected each other’s work” (p. 436)10.
Economic inequality can be held responsible for different kinds of conflicts and
instabilities including economic and financial ones: Cramer (2005) recalls that
Marriner  Eccles,  the  Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  during  the  Great
Depression, identified wealth inequality as the main culprit of the crisis: “A giant
suction pump had by 1929-1930 drawn into a few hands an increasing portion
of currently produced wealth. In consequence, as in a poker game where the
chips were concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, the other fellows could stay
in the game only by borrowing. When the credit ran out, the game stopped.” A
similar  story  seems  to  characterize  also  the  recent  global  financial  crisis.
Economic inequality implied the need for those lagging behind to raise debts in
order to keep up with the richest ones (Galbraith, 2012). Such debts, as soon as
interest  rates  increased,  turned  out  to  be  excessive  and  determined  the
economic crisis, which certainly represent a source of instability and conflicts.
Within countries inequality may also determine a reduction of the degree of trust
among citizens. In turn, such a reduced trust, by undermining the social capital of the
country, contributes to create the favorable conditions for conflictual situations. The
relationship between inequality and social capital is discussed in the next Section.
2.2. Within countries inequality and social capital 
The "ultimatum game" clearly shows how the lack of a common, shared ideal of
fairness  and  justice  may produce  open  distributive  conflicts  ending  up  in  a
Pareto inferior equilibrium. In the "ultimatum game" (Güth, Schmittberger,   &
Schwarze,  1982) one player  has to  share a given amount  of  money with a
second player. The former proposes a given division and the second player may
accept or reject. In the latter case both players will receive nothing. Of course,
10 Some interest in the connection between economic inequality, violent crimes and civil war
appears also in the World Bank's website.
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rationality would suggest that it would be sufficient for the first player to assign
to the second one a sum which is above zero in order to secure her approval.
Experimental evidence, however, contradicts this conclusion and one possible
explanation  is  certainly  that  some  "aversion  for  injustice"  characterizes  the
second player only, so as to determine a distributive conflict between the two
players, resulting in a Pareto inferior conclusion (namely a situation in which
both of them get zero, compared to a situation in which both of them would
obtain a positive – although unequally shared – amount of money)11.
The  "aversion  for  injustice"  emerging  in  the  example  above  suggests  that
economic  inequality  may  produce  effects  that  undermine  trust  and  social
cohesion,  thereby  affecting  negatively  “social  capital”.  Let  us  define  social
capital with the help of Figure 11.
Figure 11. Dimensions of social capital
Social  capital  reflects  the  quality  of  both  institutions  and  relationships  of  a
community and it is therefore an immaterial variable, that may be identified with
both  structural  (objective)  and  cognitive  (subjective)  elements,  both  at  the
11 Other explanations are possible, based on the observation that the second player may reject
the offer of  the first  player  when the conditions for  following a rational  behavior are not
satisfied (sobriety  vs.  intoxication);  when  the  second  player  inflicts  some sort  of  ethical
punishment on the first one for her misbehavior and in order to educate her for future actions
(altruistic punishment); or when considering that it is the expected utility from money and
other relevant variables that matter rather than the amount of money per se. This includes
the sense of fairness that one would like to be respected, or simply the fact that the little sum
which  is  proposed,  although greater  than  zero,  is  so  low that  it  does  not  increase  the
expected utility of the recipient.
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macro and at the micro level.
Among  the  cognitive-micro  indicators  we  find,  for  example  the  quality  of
personal  relationships,  including  "bridging"  –  namely  connecting  -  social
networks and safety nets, which are negatively affected by social comparisons
and therefore by economic inequality12.
Since  economic  inequality  undermines  such  social  networks,  it  reduces  the
degree of trust, preventing the sharing of the common objectives to be pursued,
without  which  the  economic  performance  of  a  country  can  be  seriously
threatened. Economic inequality,  then,  paves the way to distributive conflicts
arising in order to appropriate the available resources. Wilkinson and Pickett
(2009) show that economic inequality is negatively correlated with quality-life
social indicators like trust and therefore social capital.
In unequal societies citizens may not support government spending because
they believe that it will only benefit elites. On the contrary, a lower economic
inequality strengthens social ties and causes a more peaceful and stable social
environment  and  this  in  turn  reduces  the  free  riding  behavior that  would
undermine the provision of public goods. Different levels of social capital, then,
help explaining why it is the case that exactly the same reform is successful in
one  country  and  fails  somewhere  else  (as  in  the  cases  of  Northern  and
Southern Italy analyzed in the seminal contribution of Putnam, 1993)13.
Economic inequality, then, has to be avoided not only (or not necessarily)  for
ethical or generic reasons of ‘social justice’, but mainly to avoid the negative
consequences on social capital and conflicts that it may produce.
Loungani  (2003) also observes, reporting the position of  Paul  Krugman and
others, that a high degree of inequality may favor the creation of oligarchies that
may be only interested in pursuing their own success, rather than favoring the
balanced  development  of  the  societies  they  live  in.  This  also  means  that
economic inequality may reduce the quality of democracy, given that rich people
will tend to tilt the political and economic conditions in their favor and oligarchies
can emerge. In such a situation the quality of democracy worsens, because a
12 Social capital, however, may also have bonding – rather than bridging – features. In such a
case the connections are limited to a close circle of friends of families, leaving out the rest of
people. Bonding social capital, then, further strengthens economic inequality.
13 Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) refer to this point with the expression "invariance principle",
explaining with the lack of social capital why reforms often fail.
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large part of citizens will not be pleased with the way things go for them. This
increases their sense of frustration, implying once more a deterioration of social
capital,  and  in  the  end  a  whole  range  of  possible  answers  can  emerge,
including populism, which is the phenomenon we are observing in this period
and whose roots, among several others, may then be traced back to economic
inequality14. This is a rather contentious conclusion, though. As a matter of fact,
in  trying to  interpret  the  reasons  of  its  diffusion,  it  has  been  observed  that
populism does not necessarily arise in situations in which economic inequality is
present, but rather in contexts in which culture, perceptions of being left behind,
status anxiety, fears (no matter whether justified or not), age, marginalization
and  physical  distance  from  areas  of  prosperity  or  just  a  generalized
unhappiness, matter more than economics.
A further issue is whether wealth inequality, rather than income inequality, would
be the driving force of populist conflicts and in the end of the deterioration of the
quality of democracy (Alevich and Soci, 2017). From this point of view, it can be
argued that housing can have been a leading factor in creating generational
wealth  inequality,  given  that  home  owners  –  typically  older  people  -  had
benefitted from asset price inflation, which had largely damaged young people.
Given the role of interest rates in affecting wealth and the price of assets, then,
it is an open question whether low interest rates may have increased economic
inequality by increasing the value of wealth  due to the negative relationship
between the two, or may have reduced it, given that low interest rates also help
reducing unemployment and rents from savings as Piketty (2001) has strongly
argued.
2.3. Cross-country inequality and conflicts
In the previous section we have addressed the possible relationship between
within  countries  inequality  and  (internal)  conflicts  (erosion  of  social  capital,
security  in  urban and rural  areas,  violent  crimes,  social  unrest,  civil  wars and
revolutions, political assassination, the deterioration of the quality of democracy
and so on). 
Let us turn now to the effects of cross-country inequality on conflicts. 
A first obvious, although indirect, conflict emerging from cross-country inequality
14 See Fadda and Tridico (2017) and Center for European Reform (2016) for the connections
between economic inequality and populism.
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is represented by migrations: when moving from their own country of origin to a
(richer) country of destination, migrants hope to have the chance to increase
their own income, given the large difference in the average income between the
two countries, and the resistance of host countries with respect to migrants. It is
easy to observe that migration is induced precisely by cross-country income inequality.
Migrations (and the fear of them) often induces the opposition of the people
living in the countries of destination. Such a resistance can be explained by the
severe social conflicts migrations may generate, as the current situation clearly
shows. As a matter of fact, according to Putnam, the inflow of migrants within a
country  induces  "ethnic  diversity"  which  would  risk  destroying  the  social
cohesion of a community, therefore undermining its social capital (Putnam, 2000).
The relational component of social capital may have both bonding and bridging
features.  Bonding social  capital  is  the one characterizing closed circles  and
networks, thereby only favoring those who belong to that circle. No surprise that
migrants may risk undermining such relationships (although it  could also be
claimed that the perceived threat of migrants may strengthen the network, as
the current success of populist movements may suggest). 
As far as bridging social capital is concerned, however, migrants may actually
improve it, for example by raising the sense of solidarity in large sectors of the
population. Similarly no problems arise from migrants when they integrate in the
host countries exhibiting a complementary rather than substitutive nature (it is
sufficient to think that no threat from ethnic diversity is perceived when migrants
work as elderly care takers, manual workers in physically demanding jobs or the like). 
Abascal and Baldassarri (2015) use the same database used by Putnam (2007)
and get an opposite conclusion as to the effects of "ethnic diversity" on social
capital and potential conflicts. As a matter of fact – to simplify quite substantially
their argument - they show that it is not ethnic diversity per se that matters, but
rather the income of migrants: if white  poor people were to move to a mostly
white and wealthy neighborhood they would be equally undesired and regarded
with suspicion, while if non-white  but high-income new comers were to settle
down no issue of ethnic diversity would be raised against them by their neighbors.
An additional consequence of  cross-country (and  global) inequality has been
identified with international terrorism. After all the Doha Round of negotiations
within the WTO started just after the terrorist attack to the Twin Towers, with the
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clear  intention  of  providing  some  better  development  opportunities  to  least
developed  countries,  with  the  implicit  argument  that  the  attack  had  been
motivated by the unequal economic conditions in different parts of the world.
When  poor  countries  confront  themselves  with  rich  countries  and  when  no
chances  are  perceived  to  escape  from  the  initial  condition  of  poverty  and
deprivation, then it is likely that some forms of extreme reaction may take place
(by  taking  this  argument  to  its  extreme,  then,  in  the  absence  of  economic
development opportunities, migration may be interpreted at least as a peaceful
alternative to armed conflicts or international terrorism).
An additional, possible connection is the one between economic inequality and
wars, although in this case it might well be that the sense of frustration of the
poorest countries will have to face the military superiority of the richest ones, so
as to make war more difficult.
So,  according  to  what  precedes,  it  might  be  tempting  to  draw  a  simple
proportion, namely that civil war is to within countries inequality like international
terrorism or war is to  between countries inequality. Needless to say, however,
such a proportion is far too simple to be true. As we have discussed above, the
correlation  between  within  countries inequality  and  social  unrest  is  far  from
uncontroversially proved and the same is true for the correlation between cross-
country inequality and international terrorism or war. 
More  research  is  needed  to  unravel  and  better  qualify  these  possible
correlations.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have discussed the correlation between economic inequality and
conflicts. In order to do that I have first defined what is meant with economic
inequality  and  how  it  can  be  measured.  I  have  then  presented  the  data,
suggesting  that  over  the  past  decades  within  countries inequality  has  been
increasing together with the inequality between developed and least developed
countries (while  the positive aggregate performance of  China and India  has
stabilized  the  degree  of  inequality  between  developed  and  developing
countries).  I  have  then  reported  some of  the  standard  explanations  for  the
recent increase of economic inequality.
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In discussing the relationship between economic inequality and conflicts, I have
distinguished between the conflicts originating from  within countries inequality
and  those originating  from the  inequality  across  countries.  Inequality  within
countries can  be  considered  as  responsible,  among other  things,  for  social
unrest, civil wars, violent crimes and in more general terms for the erosion of
trust and social capital, with the result of increasing the potential for conflicts
within  a  country.  This  relationship,  however,  is  far  from linear  and  far  from
accepted  in  the  literature.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  several  authors  argue  and
suggest  that  there  exist  a  sort  of  "tolerance"  for  inequality  that  might  have
several  explanations,  including the discomforting feeling that  nothing can be
done to overturn it.
The  same  can  be  said  for  the  assumed  correlation  between  cross-country
inequality  and  international  terrorism.  International  and  inter-continental
migrations are also  considered a result  of  cross-country inequality,  although
also in this case it might well be that migrations do not take place in spite of
economic inequality because of the limitation strongly imposed by the chosen
destination countries. 
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